Political dimension of Indian federal system: an evaluation by Dalal, Rajbir Singh & Sharma, Sunil Dutt
International Research Journal of Engineering, IT & Scientific Research 
Available online at https://sloap.org/journals/index.php/irjeis/  
Vol. 2 No. 7, July 2016, pages: 25~33 
ISSN: 2454-2261  
https://sloap.org/journals/index.php/irjeis/article/view/495   
  
 
25 
 
Political Dimension of Indian Federal System: 
An Evaluation 
 
  
 
Rajbir Singh Dalal a 
  Sunil Dutt Sharma b 
 
Article history:  Abstract 
 
 
Received: 9 February 2016 
Accepted: 30 May 2016 
Published: 31 July 2016 
 
 
 
 
Indian federalism is a blend of formation of federations of both the existing 
modes of federations The prevailing situations at the juncture in the country 
forced the Constituent Assembly to make India a federation with the strong 
central government. The constitution makes adequate provisions for a true 
federation to meet out all the exigencies. In practice, it reflects both federal 
and unitary governments’ features as per the demand of the situations and has 
experienced, the bitter taste of emergency and coalition government. The 
decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court also contributed to clearing the grey 
areas. Undoubtedly, the constitution is a fundamental document to provide 
the guidelines and limits to government. Its success and applicability 
ultimately depend upon the mental make-up, honesty, and commitment of the 
persons at the helm of the affairs. The present write-up comprises of salient 
features of Indian federation, its historical profile, and the concluding 
remarks. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
India is a large country with wide socio-cultural, regional, linguistic, and geographical diversities. Such a diverse 
and vast country cannot be administered and ruled from a single Centre, hence opted for the federal system. 
Federalism is a remarkable vehicle for accommodating and managing diversities, multiplicities, and pluralities. It 
refers to a political system wherein the Central government and constituent States jointly share the powers of 
government within their respective areas distributed under the supreme authority of the Constitution. It is a pragmatic 
political organization aimed at maintaining a compromise between the states, which wish to come together under the 
authority of Union and at the same time retain their autonomy, diversity, and identity1. It is the most natural form of 
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governance in pluralistic setting. Therefore, founding fathers of Indian Constitution who were deeply concerned 
about ensuring the unity and integrity of country made no exception. The existence of numerous groups, with diverse 
legitimate interests within the political system, left no alternative for them, but to opt of federal setup2. The 
Constitution explicitly incorporated a federal structure, with States as subnational entities having reasonable 
autonomy. 
A federation can be formed in two ways, that is, bottom-up or centrifugal wherein peripheral units integrate to 
form a whole (like the USA) with virtually sovereign provincial units ceding power to form Union, another one is 
top-down or centripetal with a strong unitary structure carving out federated units by granting them autonomy to 
promote their regional interest and better management. From within the above two models of the federation, we 
adopted the later one with strong Centre because of the contextual circumstances of the 1940s and eventual partition 
of India-Pakistan led to deep-seated apprehension regarding the future existence of Indian Republic. As the Indian 
federalism is in operation since the last 5 and a half decades, hence a modest attempt has been made in the present 
write up to assess its basic features and nature from political aspects. How and to what extent the party system and 
mandates for general elections have affected the functioning and practical aspect of Indian federalism. Besides, the 
challenges and suitable suggestions have been given in this paper. 
 
 
2.  Materials and Methods 
 
The present study is historical and analytical in nature based on the primary and secondary data collected from 
various sources particularly the constitution of India and commentaries on it by the dozens on the topic. Besides, the 
continuous observation and understanding of the authors regarding the functioning of the Indian federal system is 
another major source of information on the present paper. 
 
 
Features of Indian Federalism 
  
A federation establishes such a governmental machinery where two different types of governments- central and 
provincial levels not only exist but also work in harmony and independently largely. Indian federalism is unique 
having features of both the centripetal and centrifugal systems and a blend of the two prevailing systems. Indian 
federal system has the following features:  
1) Written Constitution - The most important feature of a federation is that its Constitution should be written one 
so that both the Union government as well as the State can refer to that as and when needed. The Constitution 
of India is a written document comprising of 395 articles, 24 parts, and 12 schedules. It is the most elaborated 
Constitution in the world. It establishes the supremacy of the Constitution and both the Union and the States 
drive powers from the Constitution as to be independent in their spheres of governance. 
2) Rigid Constitution - The procedure of amending the Constitution in a federal system is normally rigid. Indian 
Constitution provides that some amendments (Art. 368) require a special majority. Such amendment has to be 
passed by a majority of total members of each house of the Parliament as well as by a two-thirds majority of 
members present and voting therein. However, in addition to this process, some amendments must be 
approved by at least 50% of the states. After this procedure, the amendment is signed by the Head of the State 
i.e. the President. Since changes related with federal aspects take place by special majority and ratification by 
half of the States, Indian Constitution has been rightly called a rigid Constitution. 
3) Division of Powers - In our Constitution, there is a clear division of powers so that the States and the Centre 
are required to enact and legislate within their sphere of activity and none violates its limits and tries to 
encroach upon the functions of the other. Our Constitution enumerates three lists viz. the Union, the State, and 
the Concurrent List. The Union List consists of 100 subjects (originally 97) of national importance such as 
Defense, Railways, Post and Telegraph etc. The State List consists of 61 subjects (originally 66) of local 
interest such as Public Health, Police etc. The Concurrent List has 52 subjects (originally 47) important to 
both the Union and the State such as Electricity, Trade Union, Economic and Social Planning etc. The 
residuary powers to legislate on subjects not mentioned in any of the three lists are given to the Centre. 
4) Bicameralism – The Constitution provides for bicameral legislature at the Union level consisting of an Upper 
House (Rajya Sabha) and Lower House (Lok Sabha). The Rajya Sabha represents the states of Indian 
federation, while Lok Sabha represents the will of the people of India as a whole. However, Unlike the USA, 
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states are not given equal representation in Rajya Sabha in India. Indian states are given representation in it on 
basis of their population. That is why states like UP, Bihar (before bifurcation), Maharashtra, West Bengal are 
given more seats than GOA, Mizoram, Manipur etc.   
5) Independence of the Judiciary - Another very important feature of a federation is an independent judiciary to 
interpret the Constitution and to maintain its sanctity. The Supreme Court of India has the original jurisdiction 
(Art. 131) to settle disputes between the Union and the States or between the states. It is the last interpreter of 
the constitution and can see the validity of legislation passed by the Parliament and the State Legislature or 
the actions of union & state governments. It can declare a law or an executive order as unconstitutional hence 
null and void if it contravenes any provision of the Constitution under the power of judicial review.  
 
 
Is India a Quasi-Federation? 
 
Federalism in India has evolved to suit Indian context, which is typical in nature, hence it is a blend of both 
unitary as well as federal features. While the basic federal features are inherent in the Constitution, the rest of the 
features has been suitably modified to suit the Indian requirements. i.e. traumatic partition, centrifugal tendencies, 
pluralistic society, illiteracy and ignorance, chronic poverty and unemployment etc.. Many of the features were toned 
down to give fundamental importance for the preservation of unity and integrity of the country. Hence, Constitution 
of India deviated from a traditional federal systems like USA, Switzerland, and Australia and incorporated a large 
number of unitary provisions, which makes the Centre have greater power than States, tilting the balance of power in 
favors of Centre on the pattern of the Canadian constitution.  
Article 1 of the Constitution reads India, i.e. Bharat shall be the Union of States, and the term federation is not 
used at all. It implies that Union has not been brought into existence due to an agreement between the States rather to 
a large extent it implies that States have been created by the Constitution. The States do not have the right to secede 
from the Union. Clarifying the term used before the Constituent Assembly, Dr. B R Ambedkar pointed out that 
Indian Union is neither a result of any contract between the union and indestructible states nor the states have any 
right to secede. Moreover, the Union has the right to create new States by altering, adding or reducing territorial 
boundaries of the states. In this sense, India is rightly described as ‘an indestructible Union of destructible States’. 
The Centre appoints the Governor of the States and may take over the administration of the State on the 
recommendations of the Governor or otherwise. In other words, s/he is the agent of the Centre in the States. The 
working of Indian federal system clearly reveals that the Governor has acted more as Centre’s representative than as 
the Head of the State. This office has been very much misused by Central Governments to serve their stakes. The 
Governors themselves toed to the wishes of political masters at the Centre causing abysmal fall of their constitutional 
authority. This enables the Union Government to exercise control over the state administration. Moreover, the 
Governor con forwards any bill passed by the state legislature to the consent of President, which abrogates state 
autonomy.  
The equality of units (states) in a federation is best guaranteed by their equal representation in the Upper House 
of the federal legislature (Parliament). However, this is not applicable in case of Indian States. They have unequal 
representation in the Rajya Sabha. In a true federation such as that of United States of America every state 
irrespective of their size in terms of area or population, it sends two representatives in the Upper House i.e. Senate. 
In case of disturbances in any state or part thereof, the Union Government is empowered to depute Central Forces in 
the State or to the disturbed part of the State.  
In addition, all important appointments such as those of the Chief Election Commissioner, the Finance 
Commission, the Comptroller and Auditor General, Judges in the Supreme Court and High Courts etc. are made by 
the Union Government. Besides, there is single citizenship. There is no provision for separate Constitutions for the 
States. The States cannot propose amendments to the Constitution and such amendments can only be made by the 
Union Parliament. In order to ensure uniformity and to maintain minimum common administrative standards without 
impairing the federal system, All India Services such as IAS and IPS have been created which are kept under the 
ultimate control of the Union. The federal principle envisages a dual system of courts, but in India, there is unified 
judiciary with the Supreme Court at the apex and the gross use of SLPs under Article 136 has just ruled out the 
requirement of NOC from High Court for Appeals against its decisions.  
In financial matters too, the States depend upon the Union to a great extent. The States do not possess adequate 
financial resources to meet their requirements. No State is financially self-sufficient as each one is dependent on 
Centre for financial grants, which cut at the very roots of State autonomy. Even the critics have called Indian states 
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as glorified municipalities due to their poor financial positions. The functioning of Finance Commission and 
Planning Commission has further eroded the autonomy of States because, in the name of real and supposed needs of 
planned development, it has expanded the authority of Union Government often in total disregard of federal 
intentions of Constitution3. The Constitution of India establishes a strong Centre by assigning all important subjects 
to Centre as per Union List along with residuary power to legislate. Moreover, during emergencies – national (Art. 
352), state (Art. 356) and financial (Art. 360), the Central Government becomes all powerful and the states go into 
the total control of Centre. It converts the federal structure into unitary one.  
It is clear that there is a tilt in favor of Centre which has promoted the Constitutional expert and scholar K.C. 
Wherein to term the Indian Republic as a ‘quasi-federal’. He remarked that “Indian Union is a unitary state with 
federal features rather than a federal state with subsidiary unitary features4”. Whereas Morris Jones described it as 
‘cooperative federalism’ and also as bargaining federalism5. Ivor Jennings described it as “Federation with a strong 
centralizing tandency6”. However, Granville Austin aptly summarized and analyzed by saying that though the 
Constitution has created a strong Central Government, it has not made the State Government weak and has not 
reduced them to the level of administrative agencies for execution of policies of Central Government. He described 
the Indian federation as “A new kind of federation to meet India’s peculiar needs7” D D Basu called it both federal 
and unitary as per requirements and situations. 
 
 
3.  Results and Discussions 
 
Indian federalism has gone through various phases in the last 6 and a half decades. The detail is as under: 
1) Phase I (1947-1967)- Concentration of powers in hands of Central government did not create serious conflicts 
in early years of functioning because of single-party rule both at the Centre as well as most of the States, that 
is, the Indian National Congress (with few exceptions, like Kerala and West Bengal). Many potential Inter-
State or Centre-State conflicts were resolved within the party. In spite of centralization and unitary bias of the 
Constitution, States were largely optimistic and hopeful about economic progress of the country. Political 
leadership at the apex level was democratic in nature and was able to articulate the collective needs and 
aspirations of the people. Institutions like Planning Commission which demonstrated a centralizing trend were 
started. But this period was not solely dominated by the trend of centralization. One of the major democratic 
movements in the post-independence period, the movement for the formation of linguistic states took place in 
the fifties which resulted in the formation of linguistic States in 1956. This laid the basis for the assertion by 
States for greater powers. So Union government followed it up with the institution of National Development 
Council (NDC) to ensure that formal and participation of State Government happens in the national planning 
process. All in all, this phase was largely homogeneous and relatively conflict-free. 
2) Phase II (1967-1975) - By the mid-sixties, centralized planning had started to show structural and operational 
flaws. State governments were becoming increasingly restless about the pace of economic progress and social 
development. The year 1967, was a watershed moment when single party rule came to an end. The Congress 
party for the first time lost in nine states and non-Congress (SVD) state governments came into being 
including Left-oriented United Government in West Bengal and Kerala. A regional elite which emerged in the 
States were no longer willing to accept the overall domination of the Centre and demanded key concessions to 
State governments and restructuring of Centre-State relations. At the apex level, there was a change in 
political leadership and the then Prime Minister Smt. Indira Gandhi started making attempts and initiated 
reforms which were seen as efforts to consolidate Central domination over the State. Article 356 was now 
increasingly used for political score-settling and toppling rival state governments. The unitary tendencies 
were reinforced with the institution of Governor now becoming more of an agent of Centre. The post of 
Governor became largely politicized. There partisan and selfish acts have reduced the Indian federalism into a 
mockery of State autonomy. This phase was largely characterized by the combative relationship between 
Centre and State. 
3) Phase III (1975-1977) - The previous phase ultimately culminated in the declaration of emergency due to 
internal disturbance. The country got transformed into a unitary set up and into a near authoritarian regime. 
The 42nd Constitutional Amendment of 1976 was enacted which resulted in fundamental changes in most of 
the parts of the constitution. The Centre sought to transfer subjects from State list into Concurrent list 
whenever an opportunity presented itself. Some of these actions and omissions reached zenith during an 
internal emergency.  
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4) Phase IV (1977-1989) - With the change of leadership in the post-emergency period there was also changed in 
the party and many of the measures taken during emergency phase were revised by the 44th Constitutional 
Amendment Act, 1978. However, the experiment was short-lived and after a break, the single-party rule was 
restored. From 1985 onwards, the then PM initiated a new trend by talking of decentralization. He started 
holding direct conferences with District Magistrates / Collectors which was not well received by the States 
which treated this as an unwarranted interference in their domains. In addition, Panchayati Raj was talked 
about which was perceived by the State government as an attempt to bypass federal character and create a 
strong local government. In the latter part of this phase, parties with regional agendas (e.g. Assam, Andhra 
Pradesh, and Punjab) came to power in some states. They started demanding greater autonomy to the states 
and were against the use of Article 356 and politicization of Governor's post. The Centre responded by 
appointing Sarkaria Commission which was to go into the entire gamut of the Centre-State relationship and 
give its recommendations. 
5) Phase V (1990-1995) – Since the 1990s India appears to have become more federalized than before. The 
political contestation between the forces of centralization and federalism did not result into the clear-cut 
victory of either side. While there has not been a substantial change in the unitary features of Constitution and 
financial system, the political parties have evolved on federal lines. The end of one party (Congress) 
domination by late eighties created an atmosphere to check the rampant centralization. After a brief period of 
instability, a coalition government came to power at Central level. Regional parties had played an important 
role both in the formation as well as in the sustenance of Central government. For the first time in 1989, a 
National Front coalition government headed by Mr. V.P. Singh, which had major regional parties like TDP, 
DMK, and AGP, took office at Centre. This government took certain steps to strengthen federal principles by 
setting up an Inter-State Council (ISC) and by promising to rejuvenate NDC to make it an effective forum for 
Centre and State to discuss policy issues. In the early nineties, with coming up of Minority Government, New 
Economic Policy was brought out, which made fundamental changes in the economy and heralded the 
beginning of Liberalization, Privatization, and Globalization (LPG) phenomenon. However, the States were 
hardly kept in the policy loop since much of the reforms were macro-oriented and did not involve the active 
participation of State governments. This phase was also momentous. The 73rd and 74th Constitutional 
Amendments which introduced 11th and 121st schedules in the constitution for Panchayati Raj Institutions 
(PRIs) and Urban Local Bodies (ULBs) respectively established the third tier of federalism in the country. 
This phase saw the beginning of bargaining nature of Indian federalism. The decision of Hon’ble Supreme 
Court in S. R. Bommai vs Union of India case (1993) proved a milestone in center-states relations particularly 
regarding the imposition of Article 356. The court ruled that the powers of the President regarding the 
imposition of Article 356 (dissolving the State Assembly) are under the judicial review and the Assembly will 
be kept into suspended animation for a period of two months until it is ratified by the Parliament, failing 
which the Assembly will be restored. Moreover, the court can seek the material facts behind imposing such 
proclamation rather going into the controversies of the material. If the court strikes down the proclamation 
then it has the power to restore the dismissed state government to office [JT (1994) 2SC 213].8 this decision 
has made difficult to impose President’s rule in rival states and equally difficult to sustain it, hence its misuse  
for political gains is minimized.  
6) Phase VI (1995 onwards) - Coalition government seems to have become the norm at the Central level and 
national politics seems to have become sum total of State / Regional politics. Formation of United Front 
Government and in all subsequent Governments- 1998, 1999, 2004 and 2009 endorses the coalition regime.  
Strong regional parties asserted themselves and obtained not just representation but also key portfolios at 
Union level. This phase was also marred by rising regional inequalities (Bharat Vs India) due to LPG and 
Centre had to respond by initiating regional development programmes to ensure balanced regional 
development. In 2014, the NDA led by Sh. Narender Modi again formed a coalition government in which 
coalition partners are in a weak position as compared to the BJP. Moreover, direct conflicts have been noticed 
between the union government and the states particularly the PM and the State stalwarts. Even some CMs 
skipped from the meeting of PM and the Congress Party advised its CMs not to attend the meetings of Prime 
Minister (Narender Modi) as the latter is letting them down. Moreover, Sh. Modi has not the stature of a 
national leader as he never remained a union minister or leader of opposition in Parliament; hence his 
acceptability as a PM was not easily digested by the opposition particularly by the Congress Party.  
 
           ISSN: 2454-2261 
IRJEIS   Vol. 2 No. 7, July 2016, pages: 25~33 
30
The Uttarakhand High Court quashed President’s rule in the state imposed by Modi led the NDA government on the 
eruption of defection in the ruling Congress Party. The High Court ruled that the Harish Rawat’s government has to 
face floor test on April 29, 2016. The Chief Justice-led Division Bench ruled, “ The soul of the matter is whether it is 
open to the Central Government to get rid of State Governments, supplant or uproot democratically elected 
government, introduce chaos, undermine confidence of little man who stands with a white paper to cast his vote 
braving snow, heat, and rain… What is at stake here is not just the petitioner’s government (Rawat), but democracy 
at large.” The court further observed, “Toppling a democratically elected government breeds cynicism in the hearts 
of citizens who participate in the democratic system and also undermines democracy and the foundation of 
federalism”.9 Thus the High Court has for the first time revived a dismissed government in any state in the country 
and the experts are of the opinion that this verdict will strengthen the democracy and federalism in the country. In the 
past, the High Courts and the Supreme Court had struck down imposition of President’s rule in the various states, but 
refused to restore the dismissed State Governments in view of subsequent developments such as completion of fresh 
elections that came in the way of any effective court order.10 However, the Centre Government challenged this 
decision in the Hon’ble Supreme Court on the very next day of its pronouncement. The Supreme Court restored 
President’s rule in the state till 27-04-2016 when the Centre assured that it would not try to install BJP led 
government in the state.11However there was a perception that Centre is suffering from ‘stepmother syndrome’ and 
only those States whose parties form part of Central Government are being benefited. The compulsion of second 
generation reforms has made both the Centre and the State come together so as to harness the potential of LPG and 
combat the crisis and challenges put forward by complexities of modern time. Today the Centre is also in a greater 
engaging mood with the States since it is the State government’s performance which will ultimately ensure the 
success of policy initiatives taken by them. Also, changes in contours of law and order are forcing Center and State 
to find consensus-based solutions so as to take a united and an effective stand and adopt a multipronged strategy to 
deal with problems like poverty, illiteracy, nasalism, terrorism, communalism etc. 
 
 
4.  Conclusion 
 
In a federal system of government, there is a need for clear-cut division of power between the Union and the 
States. This also requires a written and rigid Constitution and an independent Judiciary to decide disputes between 
the Union and the States. Though the Indian Constitution has all such features of a federal state, it is indeed difficult 
to put the Indian Constitution in the category of true federations. The framers of the Constitution have incorporated 
certain non-federal features in it such as single citizenship, single judiciary, a strong Centre, appointment of the 
Governor by the President, unequal representation in the Rajya Sabha and so on. All these indicate a tilt towards 
strong Centre and the States have to work in close co-operation with them. The Constitution is federal in form but 
unitary in spirit. The Centre has been assigned a dominant role which became necessary keeping in view the dangers 
to the unity and integrity of the nation. Therefore, there are provisions for co-operative federalism. 
The working of the Indian Constitution over the years indicates that relations between the Centre and the States 
have not remained very cordial. The States have started demanding more autonomy. Various commissions have been 
appointed by the Government of India to review the Centre-State relations. The Sarkaria and M. M. Punchi 
Commissions examined the problem and recommended changes in the area of federal, legislative, administrative, and 
financial relations. President Pranab Mukherjee while addressing the two days Conference of Governors, 
underscored the necessity of those occupying constitutional position to uphold the sanctity of document stating the 
country grew in strength on account of steadfast adherence to the principles enshrined in our constitution. This 
reference came to the backdrop of recent controversy over Arunachal Pradesh Governor JP Rajkothwa’s action (of 
imposing President rule in the state despite majority) that is now being heard by the Supreme Court. The Governor 
he said, can play an inspirational role to ensure active cooperation in implementing successfully schemes like Make 
in India, Startup India, Smart city mission and Swachh Bharat Mission requiring close partnership with state 
governments so that goal of inclusive development can be attained. The President said that 2015 was a difficult year 
during which the country faced challenges from the global economic slowdown, climate changes, and internal and 
external security.12 
In contemporary times, for all practical reasons, the concept of State has undergone a fundamental 
transformation. Now, we have adopted a calibrated and holistic approach. If growth has to be integrative and 
inclusive, both Centre and State need to establish congruency of goals and strategies. Isolated efforts however well-
intentioned will be inadequate in solving the problems. Today, India is poised for takeoff with its huge social capital 
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and demographic dividend at their disposal. However to tap it, it requires synergy to be established between Centre, 
State, and Local governments by collaborative efforts and thus, there is no a fundamental dichotomy between the 
Centre and the States. Both can coexist with each other. The need of the hour is to have strong governance, which 
will ensure that policies are translated into action. Moreover, for the smooth functioning of democratic institutions 
healthy convention and political culture, statesmanship and vigilant citizenry are equally important and needs to 
practice. 
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